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I. Introduction
T he s ig n a llin g (or expectations-) ch a n n e l suggests th a t sterilized in te r ventions in the foreign exchange m ark e t can affect exchange rates by con veying inform atio n ab o u t future m on etary policy. T hereby, sterilized inter v entio ns are o fficial purchases (sales) o f fo re ig n ex change w hose m oney m ark et effects are im m e diate ly offset by open m ark e t sales (purchases) of d o m estic g o v e rn m e n t securities o f e q u a l a m o u n t.1 A c c o rd in g to th e sig n a llin g c h a n n e l, ce n tral b a n k purchases o f fo re ig n ex ch ang e in d ic a te an e x p ansio n ary fu tu re m o n e ta ry p o licy c o n siste n t w ith th e in te rv e n tio n . If successful, m a rk e t p a rtic ip a n ts revise th e ir ex ch ang e rate ex pectations.
T his, in tu rn , is im m e diate ly reflected in the spot exchange rate.
Since M u ssa， s [1981] in itial article on th is subject, research has advanced m ostly along em pirical lines (see E diso n [1993] fo r a survey). O n th e one h a n d , these em pirical studies confirm th a t sterilized interve ntio ns m ay have an inform atio nal role th ro u g h w hich they can im p act onto exchange rates (D o m in g u e z [1992] ; D o m in g u e z an d F re n k e l [1990] ; Ju rg e n s e n [1983] ).
Specifically, D o m in g u e z [1990] and K a m in s k i and Lew is [1996] T his paper tu rn s to the theoretical fo u nd atio ns of th e s ig n allin g channel.
It develops a fo rm al two-country m od el, w here in te rv e n tio n s are u sed by b o th n a tio n 's ce n tral b a n k s to s ig n a l fu tu re m o n e ta ry p o licy in te n tio n s .
N otice th a t sig n alling is only successful if interve ntio ns lead to a revision of ex ch ang e rate ex pectation s. Firstly, th is re q u ire s th a t in te rv e n tio n s are observable and th a t the inform atio nal co nte nt o f in te rv e n tio n signals is used by the m ark et in fo rm in g exchange rate expectations. Secondly, th e m on e 1. Since sterilized interventions alter the relative supplies o f dom estic and foreign cur rency den om inate d assets, they m ay also be effective w ith in a portfolio balance approach. However, relatively sm all intervention volum es com pared to m arket size and the lack of significant em pirical evidence in favor of predictable exchange rate effects rules out th is channel as an effective m eans o f exchange rate m anagem ent 〈 see Rogoff [1984] , and E dison [1993] for a survey). ta ry p o licy stance im p lie d by in te rv e n tio n s m u s t be cre d ib le . T his paper explicitly considers b o th o f these issues.
T u r n in g to th e latter, th e existence o f a tra d e o ff betw een in te rn a l and ex ternal p o licy objectives m ay re s u lt in a c re d ib ility p ro b le m due to the potential incentives for th e central b an k to renege on m on etary policy sig nals. In contrast to the repeated gam es literature, I argue here th a t reputa tio nal effects cann ot com pletely elim inate th is cre dib ility pro b le m betw een the central b a n k and the private sector. Instead, I suggest th a t cre dib ility is only p a rtia l in the sense th a t the m ark et attaches a prob ability less th an one to the event th a t a n atio n 's central b an k subsequently m onetizes its inter ventions. T h is reduces the effectiveness of interve ntio n operations. R egard in g the form er issue, evidence fro m b o th th e econom ic and psychological sciences suggests th a t m ark et participants w ill select only a fraction o f daily in fo rm a tio n im p in g in g on th e fo re ig n ex ch ang e m ark et. T h is process of inform atio n selection is fo rm ally incorporated into the m od el in a th e o ry of non-rational expectations. These also reduce th e effectiveness of sterilized interventions to m anipulate exchange rates. P artial cre dib ility and non-ratio nal expectations m ay th u s explain the diffe rin g experiences o f countries and tim e periods observed in the real w orld.
T he purpose o f th is paper is th u s tw ofold: F irst, it provides a po te ntial explanation for som e of the questions raised by the em pirical fin d in g s. Sec ondly, it develops a com plete two-country m od el w h ich m ay th e n be u sed to address th e question o f o ptim al exchange rate m anag em en t and interve n tio n policies. To m y k now ledge, th e a u th o r's d is s e r ta tio n 〈 F ab ian [1993]) represents the only such fram ew ork, w h ic h explicitly m odels the process of expectation fo rm ation and the m acroeconom ic effects of interve ntio n po li cies. T he p re s e n t pape r is base d on th is w ork . A n ac c o m p a n y in g pap e r 〈 Reeves [1997a] ) discusses th e application o f th is theoretical fram ew ork to interventio n policy.
T he paper is o rg an ize d as follow s: T he two open eco nom ies are in tro duced in Section II. Section I I I discusses sterilized interve ntio ns w h ich are used by ce n tral b a n k s to s ig n a l ch ang e s o f th e ir fu tu re m o n e ta ry p o licy stance. In th is section, interve ntio n signals are assum ed fu lly credible, and ex pectations are fo rm e d ration ally. S ectio n IV in tro d u c e s th e c re d ib ility p ro b le m betw een th e ce n tral b a n k s and th e private sector. H ere, p a rtia l M t is the m oney supply, Pt the price level, Y exogenous and constant real incom e and rt the real interest rate o f the ho m e co un try in period t. Starred v a ria b le s re fe r to th e fo re ig n co u n try . St d e n o te s th e c u r r e n t n o m in a l exchange rate expressed as the hom e currency price for one u n it o f foreign currency. T he exchange rate is flexible, and Se t+1 is its expected future value.
A ll v a ria b le s , e x ce p t in te r e s t rates, are e x p re ss e d in lo g a r ith m s . I t is assum ed th a t each co un try 's residents only h o ld th e ir ow n respective cur rency, a n d th a t in te re s t an d in c o m e e la s tic itie s in th e s ta n d a rd m o n e y dem and functions (1) and (1) ' are identical. T hus exchange rate effects w ill n o t be due to co un try differences. Uncovered interest parity given by equa tio n (2) im p lie s th a t dom estic and fo re ig n assets are p e rfe ct sub stitutes.
T his ru le s o ut a portfolio balance effect.2 T u rn in g to (3), the assum ption of p u rch asing pow er parity th ro u g h o u t assures an im m e d iate price adjustm ent in response to a disturbance. T his m akes th e m od el essentially static.3 Last ly, the nature o f the m odel is purely m onetary. In te rv e n tio n signals are th u s 2. A risk prem ium w ould allow sterilized interventions to affect St additionally th ro ugh the portfolio balance channel. T his does n ot change the n ature of the results as shown in Appendix 1.
3. Alternatively, a sluggish price adjustm ent m echanism could be accom m odated in the m odel. W h ile com plicating the analysis, th is w ould n ot alter the qualitative findings. U sing (5) and (6), the expected lo n g ru n exchange rate is given bŷ i S 2 = s 0 + r ( / -n .
II. The Two-Country Model
U sing (1) - (3) and (7) yields the spot exchange rate (short ru n equilibrium ) as s1=50+-^r ( / -r ) . E ng e l and F rankel [1984] ). N ote th at the s h o rt ru n exchange rate m oves in the sam e direction as the lo n g ru n rate b u t falls s h o rt o f the entire lo n g ru n a d ju stm e n t. P rice fle x ib ility in every p e rio d d am p e n s th e e x ch ang e rate m ovem ent.6 W ith in the econom ic constraints postulated by equations (1) - (4), how ever, th e exchange rate effects achieved by any g ive n v o lu m e of interventio ns are m axim ized.
5. To be sure, it is assum ed that -by intervening 一 central banks convey their m one tary policy inten tions to the m arket. T hus an e x plicit sig n al accom panies foreign exchange transactions. T he case w here central banks leave it to th e m ark et to extract this signal from observed interventions -though interesting in its own rightis not considered. Rather, the interest here is in the question of how a given signal leads to a revision of exchange rate expectations.
6. In a situation of price rigidity in period 1 w ith P1 = P0 and P\ = S1 im m ediately reaches its long run value. 
IV. Credibility and Central Bank Reputation

A P a r tia l C re d ib ility
In reality, a co m m itm e n t technology w ill no t be available to central banks.
In the strategic gam e th a t central banks play against th e private sector, the m o n e ta ry a u th o ritie s co uld renege on in te rv e n tio n signals, if the re exist incentives to do so. T his w ill be anticipated by rational m ark et participants. pants a ttach to th e events th a t th e d o m e s tic a n d fo re ig n c e n tra l b a n k s , respectively, im p le m e n t the m on etary policy im p lie d by th e ir inte rve ntio n operations; 0 < p y p* < 1. T he expected dom estic m oney supply u p o n inter ventions o f the ho m e central b a n k is the n given by
w ith E 1(M 2 1 i? T ak ing expectations in (6) and u sin g (9) yields
T ogether w ith (1) - (3) and (5) this gives the period 1 exchange rate
T hus partial credibility reduces the effectiveness o f sterilized interventions.
T he follow ing sections focus on the determ inants o f central ban k credibility.
B. The Repeated Signalling Game
To dete rm ine th e size of p (sim ilarly p *)，co nside r th e fo llo w in g policy prob le m for the ho m e central bank:
m in co(S1-S)2 + (l-co)(M2-M 2)90 <co<l (10) m 2 一 w here Sx = h (E 1M 2), M = M 0, and h is a real-valued fu nction. T his problem ex em plifies a typical tra d e o ff betw een in te rn a l a n d ex ternal po licy objec tives. In terpre ting expectations E X M 2 as the private sector's "strategy", le t a solution to the above gam e be denoted by a strategy pair (M 2, E 1M 2).
In a c o m m itm e n t re g im e th e s o lu tio n is g iv e n by (M2， M 2), w here M 2 denotes the m oney supply th at m in im ize s (10). If central b a n k objectives are u n k n o w n to th e priv ate secto r,7 th e c e n tra l b a n k m a y m a k e M 2 k n o w n th ro u g h interventio ns in the foreign exchange m arket. It is th is in fo rm atio n al assym m etry th a t gives rise to the s ig n allin g effect.8 In the absence o f a co m m itm e n t technology, m onetary policy is set discretionary, and th e pri 7. It suffices to assum e th at they are partially unknow n, for instance, th at w eights are unknow n.
8. In the sim plest case th is reduces the central b an k's strategy space to the choice of the probability qe [0, 1] w ith w hich to carry out M 2-^ then played w ith probability w ould use announcem ents as the preferred policy since these avoid costs CM. Also, it is conceivable th a t 7 could be country-specific. B ut (9) im plies th at yp contains all credibility effects. Here, wlog, p alone captures all country-specific inform ation. 14. T his section follows Fabian [1993， chapter 5] , where an expanded discussion m ay be found.
P = f[ R e p , Cm0( / ,Z ) ,C m 2(Z )] w i t h / :
[0,1] in g interve ntio n volum es as w ell as the m oney supplies im plie d by the sig nals of these policies, several factors w ill affect the cre dib ility param eters p and p\ a) I f th e private sector co ntin ue s to fo rm expectations ab o u t the dom es tic (foreign) m oney supply based solely o n o bserved be h av io r o f th e ho m e (foreign) central b an k , b o th central b a n k 's re pu tatio n s m ay co n tin u e to dif fer. However, fo r each cen tral b an k th e costs o f re n e g in g on in te rv e n tio n sign als increase if an in te rn a tio n a l re p u tatio n is at stake as w ell. N o t fol lo w ing th ro u g h w ith in te rv e n tio n sign als breaks th e co m m itm e n t vis-a-vis th e private sector and th e in te rn a tio n a l cooperative agreem ent. A s re pu ta tio n a l co sts rise w ith c e n tra l b a n k c o o p e ra tio n , c r e d ib ility p a n d p* is 
V. Model Uncertainty and Information Selection
N otice th a t (9) also im plie s that, co ntin ge nt on a central b a n k b e in g fo rth rig h t, in te rv e n tio n signals translate com pletely into chang es in exchange rate expectations. Practical interve ntio n experience is, however, character ized by a m u c h lesser degree of predictability: Even if a central b a n k has credibility, in te rv e n tio n s are n o t always successful. A n d despite id e n tical econom ic circum stances (in c lu d in g re putatio n), interventio ns are at tim es m ore effective th an at others.
These fin d in g s cannot be explained by the cre dib ility issues intro duced so far. In the m od el above, any credible interve ntio n signal conveys a con clu s iv e m e ssa g e a b o u t th e fu tu re m o n e y supply. G iv e n c r e d ib ility , th e exchange rate can be perfectly controlled by the m onetary authorities. T his is know n to m ark et participants and reflected in (conditional) expectations (8) . T h is section now conside rs u n c e rta in ty in th e sense th a t th e fu tu re exchange rate cannot be inferre d from tru e central b a n k signals. Real w orld experience m ay the n be explained by the non-rationality o f exchange rate expectations.
A The E v id e n c e o n R a tio n a l E x p e ctatio n s
T here is by now extensive econom etric evidence against the rationality of exchange rate e x p e c ta tio n s 〈 for a survey see Lewis [1995] ). R ecent studies have used survey data to directly test the conditions for rationality, nam ely th at all info rm atio n is used (orthogonality) and th a t forecasts are unbiased. Ito [1990] ; see T akagi
[1991] for a survey).16
T he field of social psychology offers an explanation for this selective use of inform atio n th ro u g h S im o n 's concept o f b o u nd ed rationality [1972, p. 416; 1959] .17 S im o n suggests th a t even th o u g h agents attem pt to be "ration al", the h u m a n m in d is lim ite d b o th in term s o f perception as w ell as inference 16 . For evidence from asset price forecasting see Brown and M aital [1981] .
17. Since h is sem inal work, m any authors have expanded the ideas in this field; see Raaij [1986] for a survey.
[ 1959， p. 306] . D ecisionm akers are ne ith e r able to acquire com plete k no w l edge of the tru e m odel n o r to translate the flood of inform ative signals into objective p ro b a b ility estim ates for all states o f th e w orld. T he situ ation is one of tru e uncertainly , w here probability estim ates are subjective and th u s heterogeneous am on g individuals.
T he overall evidence thus suggests th a t agents m ake only partial use of the available inform atio n. T he inform atio n w h ich is used appears to gener ate u nbiased, efficient predictions. T he next section incorporates th is into the interve ntio n m odel.
B. Exchange Rate Expectations
U n c e rta in ly m ay now form ally be intro d u ce d into th e sig n a llin g m odel.
T he p a rtic u la r fo rm o f u nce rtainty chosen here is th e random ness o f the m on ey supply.18 In ste ad o f th e m oney supply, ce n tral b a n k in te rv e n tio n s (Jarchow [1990] ), it, too, falls short of perfect controllability. T his introduces a signal extraction problem in detecting cen tral b ank intentions ex post w hich is relevant for credibility issues. T his is n o t consid ered here. The role of uncertainty discussed in this section is a different one. D ue to the presence of m odel uncertainty, the m arket is unable to infer econom ic equilib ri um from forth rig ht central b an k policies. T his, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of interventions, independent of reputational aspects.
T hey th e n revise th e ir exchange rate expectations co ntin ge nt on fo rth rig h t central b a n k signals. C onsid er first the situation o f perfect credibility.
In th is case, in te r v e n tio n s ig n a ls by th e h o m e and fo re ig n m o n e ta ry autho ritie s represent conclusive m essages ab o u t the future dom estic and fo reig n m o n e ta ry bases, respectively. B u t th e d ire ct lin k o f these in s tru m ents and th e exchange rate is broken. C o n d itio n al on fo rth rig h t central bank policies, expectations m ay be represented as g(n:) = g(Q0,B2,Bl)\ ^: Qj -> 91 > 0 w here is the inform atio n set pu blicly available in period 1. E tQQ contin ues to denote the period t expectation o f variable X ，b u t no lo n ge r repre sents the m athem atical expectations operator. T he fu nctio n g incorporates the cognitive processes o f inform atio n selection by w e ig h tin g in itial beliefs
by (1 -0), new inform atio n by 6:
\r ,F)=(i-e)E0s1+e(s0+/(/-/*))
( 1 1 ) Follow ing Festinger [1970 Festinger [ ] and K atona [1975 Festinger [ , 1980 , th e param eter d and th u s th e effectiveness of interve ntio n signals w ill be lower, the less overall uncertainty prevails and the m ore confident prior m arket beliefs. Also, d w ill be smaller, the m ore consistent -and th u s inform ative -previously received news item s, and the stronger the resistance to u n fittin g signals. T his m ay be viewed as th e analogue to statistical decision th e o ry 's distinctio n betw een "h a r d " and "soft" p rio r be lie fs. T h is is c o n firm e d by actu al in te rv e n tio n experience. For instance, the G erm an B und esb ank evaluates the "firm ness" o f exchange rate expectations prior to in te rv e n in g in the foreign exchange 21. For a detailed discussion of the u nderlying cognitive theories see Fabian [1993] .
the non-rationality of expectations excludes a com plete assessm ent o f prob ability distribu tio ns over com peting m odels of th e economy. Consequently, the process g o ve rn ing the revision o f beliefs cann ot be determ ined fro m the m o d e l a n d th u s re p re se n ts an e x o g e n o u s a s s u m p tio n . T he fo r m u la tio n given by (11) 
W ith E 0S1 = S0 and c o m b in in g (5) and (12), £\(S2I슛 ， R*) = S0 + 6y ( / -/ * ) , and equation (11) m a tio n w ill e q u ally lim it th e success o f b o th n a tio n 's in te rv e n tio n opera tions.
N otice th at inco m patible interventio ns, for instance m atch in g purchases and sales of the foreign currency by b o th central banks {i.e. 1 = 1*), w ill no t be successful: w hile b o th central ban k s spend inte rve ntio n resources and e n co un ter a p o te n tial c o n flict w ith th e a tta in m e n t o f th e ir in te rn a l p o licy objective in the future, only th e central b an k w ith the h ig h e r reputation w ill achieve any gains in its exchange rate target. W ith p =p\ there is no im pact on the exchange rate as agents anticipate th a t relative m oney supplies w ill rem ain u nchang ed. T hus, a role of internatio nal policy coordination, the n, m ay be to agree on com patible exchange rate targets. M o re generally, the reduced fo rm eq uatio n (14) m ay be applied to th e study of unilateral and cooperative interve ntio n p o lic ie s 〈 see Fabian [1993] ; Reeves [1997a] ). T he analysis has incorporated two key factors th a t lim it the ability of steril ized interventions in affecting th e spot exchange rate: p a rtial cre dib ility and non-rational expectations. First, the potential trade off betw een in te rn a l and ex ternal policy objectives faced by th e m on etary autho ritie s intro du ces a c re dib ility problem betw een each n atio n 's central b a n k and the private sec to r w h ic h le n d s o n ly p a rtia l c re d ib ility to in te rv e n tio n sign als. Secondly, e m p iric a l evidence in d ic a te s th a t ag ents do n o t m ake use o f a ll p u b lic ly available inform atio n. T he cognitive processes of inform atio n selection have been form ally incorporated into a th e o ry o f non-rational expectations. T he next step w ould be an em pirical te sting of th e hypotheses u n d e rly in g the m odel. T his is an extensive task w h ich m u st be left for future research. In each period t>\ , after o bserving b o th interventions and subsequent m onetary policies, the private sector updates beliefs abo ut the central b a n k types by u sin g Bayes' rule:
VI. Conclusions
23. T hat credibility is only partial in a wide class of m odels has been show n by Reeves [1997b] . T his section is based on this work. Note th at the analysis does n ot depend on this particular third central b ank type. W h a t is m erely im portant is th at th is type chooses a forth rig ht policy w ith a positive probability. O therw ise, pt(T0) = 0, so th at cre dib ility rises w ith fo rth rig h t policy m a k in g (see Reeves [1997b] ). Sim ilarly, p] < 1. C red ibility is th u s only p artial even w ith fo rth rig h t central b a n k policies. S h o u ld the ho m e central b an k renege, p t(Tc) = Prob(Tc I M 2t 半 M ot + y lt) = 0. T hen p t falls, alb eit n o t to zero due to the presence of the ra n d o m izin g type.
